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TODD SHIPYARDS CORP. V. CUNARD
LINE, LTD.: PROCEDURAL DUE
PROCESS AND AN ARBITRATOR'S
PUNITIVE DAMAGE AWARD
There is a perception among business interests and the civil
defense bar that the frequency of punitive damage awards' as well
as their magnitude2 has increased in recent years, resulting in ex-
tremely high economic and social costs.3 Predictably, these parties
have challenged the constitutionality of punitive damage awards.
The bases for these actions have included the First Amendment,4
the Eighth Amendment Excessive Fines clause,5 and substantive
due process.6 The Supreme Court has rejected each of these
1. Empircal data as to trends in the award of punitive damages is limited. See Rob-
ert E. Riggs, Constitutionaliing Punitive Damages: The Limits of Due Process, 52 OH.
ST. L. J. 859, 913 (1991). Professor Riggs conducted a rough "empirical study" of his
own, concluding that there was "[a] noticeable increase in the percentage of punitive
damages claims from 1960 to 1985, with a leveling off since then." Id. at 913
n.194.
2. Alarmists prefer to cite anecdotal evidence of recent multi-million dollar punitive
damage awards, such as Central Telecommumcations, Inc. v. TCI Cablevision, Inc., 800
F.2d 711 (8th Cir. 1986) (awarding $25 million in punitive damages), cert. denied, 480
U.S. 910 (1987), and Tetnan v. A.H. Robins Co., 738 P.2d 1210 (Kan. 1987) (awarding
$7.5 million in punitive damages), punctuated by the infamous $1 billion punitive damag-
es award in Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 729 S.W.2d 768 (rex. Ct. App. 1987), cert.
dismissed, 485 U.S. 994 (1988).
3. See, e.g., Steven H. Sneiderman, Comment, The Future of Punitive Damages After
Browning-Ferris Industries v. Kelco Disposal, 51 OH ST. L. J. 1031, 1038-41 (1990)
(chronicling the substantial impact of excessive punitive damage awards which manifests
itself as higher costs and limited choices available to consumers, wasting of social re-
sources and curtailment of new product innovation).
4. See Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 385 U.S. 130, 159-62 (1967) (holding that the
Fist Amendment does not bar an award of punitive damages against publishers in libel
suits).
5. See Browning-Ferns Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 264 (1989)
(holding that the Eighth Amendment excessive fines clause does not apply to private
awards of punitive damages).
6. See Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Humes, 115 U.S. 512, 522-23 (1885) (holding that
state statutes imposing punitive damages do not deprive citizens of their substantive due
process rights).
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challenges, while alluding to the possibility that opponents of
punitive damages might find more success in questioning the
adequacy of procedural due process7 afforded defendants facing
punitive damage awards.8
In Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Cunard Line, Ltd, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld against a
Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process challenge an arbitra-
tion panel award of $1 million in punitive damages.9 In reaching
this conclusion, however, the court failed to take into account the
relevant principles outlined in the Supreme Court's latest ruling,
Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip, on the adequacy of
process afforded by a jury's award of punitive damages." Instead,
the Ninth Circuit employed a hybrid test for determining whether
punitive damages violate the due process clause, a test which had
been expressly rejected by the Court in Pacific Mutual." This
comment will apply the Pacific Mutual rationale to the Todd Ship-
yards facts, concluding that the arbitrator's punitive damages award
in Todd Shipyards does violate the Fourteenth Amendment.
Part II of this comment examines the Pacific Mutual decision,
exploring the majority's use of a "reasonableness" approach and
contrasting it with the historical approach employed by Justice
Scalia in his concurring opinion as well as the Mathews v.
Eldridge paradigm used by Justice O'Connor in her dissent. In Part
I, the Todd Shipyards opinion will be described with a particular
7. The Fourteenth Amendment provides that "[n]o State shall make or enforce any
law which shall ... deprive any person of ... property, without due process of law."
U.S. Const. amend. XIV, cl. 1.
8. See, e.g., Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 280 (Brennan, J., concurring) (stating that
the Browning-Ferris decision "leaves the door open for a holding that the Due Process
Clause constrains the imposition of punitive damages in civil cases brought by private
parties"); see also Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 828-29 (1986) (noting the
necessity for resolution of important due process questions in the context of punitive
damage awards).
Justice Brennan foretold accurately the eventual demise of certain punitive damage
awards at the hands of the Due Process Clause. See, e.g., Mattison v. Dallas Carrier
Corp., 947 F.2d 95 (4th Cir. 1991) (rejecting a punitive damage award previously ap-
proved by the South Carolina Supreme Court on due process grounds).
9. 943 F.2d 1056, 1063-64 (9th Cir. 1991).
10. 111 S. Ct. 1032 (1991). Todd Shipyards was argued and submitted to the Ninth
Circuit on December 11, 1990; Pacific Mutual was argued more than two months earlier,
on October 3, 1990. In light of the potential impact of Pacific Mutual on its case, the
Todd Shipyards court should have delayed its decision and required the parties to submit
supplemental briefs addressing the applicability of the Pacific Mutual decision.
11. See infra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
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emphasis on the court's due process inquiry in the context of the
punitive damages award. Finally, in Part IV, this comment substan-
tiates the Pacific Mutual majority's rejection of the Mathews ap-
proach when determining the adequacy of the procedural due pro-
cess afforded to the defendant. Also in part IV, this comment
extrapolates principles from the brief and conclusory opinion of the
Pacific Mutual majority and applies them to the issue of whether
an arbitrator's award of punitive damages such as that administered
in Todd Shipyards violates the procedural due process rights of the
parties involved.
II. BACKGROUND
Arbitration has been employed as an alternative dispute resolu-
tion mechanism for many decades. It is favored for its provident
and expeditious method of settling controversies in several fields
including, inter alia, commercial, 2 labor 3 and medical malprac-
tice. 4 Since the decision to submit disputes to arbitration has
been perceived to be a voluntary contractual agreement, courts have
generally favored its use and afforded arbitrators substantial latitude
in fashioning remedies.' s
Despite the significant discretion given arbitrators in fashioning
remedies, the relationship between 'arbitration and the specific rem-
edy of punitive damages has been a strained one over the years.
Judicial posturing spans the spectrum of acceptance, ranging from
complete approval to total rejection of arbitrator's punitive damage
awards. 6 In addressing the propriety of arbitrators' awards of pu-
12. See, e.g., Bernard H. Goldstein, Alternatives for -Resolving Business Transaction
Disputes, 58 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 69, 78 (1983) (stating that commercial arbitration offers
privacy and convenience while reducing formality).
13. See, e.g., Leo Kanowitz, Alternative Dispute Resolution and the Public Interest:
The Arbitrator's Experience, 38 HAsT. L.J. 239, 284-85 (1987) (stating that "arbitration
typically resolves disputes much more quickly than the cumbersome procedures of the
NLRA).
14. See, e.g., Lauren K. Saunders, The Quest for Balance: Public Policy and Due
Process in Medical Malpractice Arbitration Agreements, 23 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 267, 268-
69 (1986) (stating that binding arbitration is a common method for screening out frivolous
malpractice suits which raise the costs of settling valid claims).
15. See, e.g., School City v. East Chicago Fed'n of Teachers, Local 511, 422 N.E.2d
656, 622 (Ind. App. 1981) (concluding that arbitrators are not bound by principle of sub-
stantive law when granting relief); see also American Arbitration Association Commercial
Arbitration Rules, rule 43 (1990) (empowering arbitrators to "grant any remedy or relief
which is just and equitable and within the terms of the agreement of the parties").
16. Several states have given blanket approval to the awarding of punitive damages by
arbitrators. See Bishop v. Holy Cross Hosp. of Silver Spring, 410 A.2d 630 (Md. App.
1087IMy]
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nitive damages, courts must endeavor to strike the appropriate bal-
ance between two conflicting principles - the parties' right to
contract with respect to the resolution of their disputes and the
state's interest in retaining the power to punish its residents as
defined by sociologically-derived philosophies about correction and
reform. The relative weights given to these principles determine
where on the spectrum of acquiescence courts will reside. 7
This policy-oriented approach to the validity of punitive dam-
age awards from arbitrators has dominated the reasoning of courts.
Inquiries as to the constitutionality of such awards, on the other
hand, have been rare. This is unfortunate since the Court has inti-
mated that the due process clause is a fertile ground for attacks on
the validity of punitive damages.
1980); Rodgers Builders, Inc. v. McQueen, 331 S.E.2d 726 (N.C. App. 1985); Grissom v.
Greener & Sumner Constr., Co., 676 S.W.2d 709 (Tex. App. 1984). On the other hand,
many state courts have totally rejected arbitrator awards of punitive damages, regardless of
whether or not the arbitrator had been empowered to award such damages by the parties.
See McLeroy v. Waller 731 S.W.2d 789 (Ark. App. 1987); United States Fidelity &
Guaranty Company v. DeFluiter, 456 N.E.2d 429 (Ind. App. 1983); Shaw v. Kuhnel &
Assoc., Inc., 698 P.2d 880 (N.M. 1985); Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 793 386
N.Y.S.2d 831 (1976). Some states refuse to adhere to either of these polar positions,
electing instead to allow punitive damages awards only when the arbitration agreement ex-
pressly empowers the arbitrator to make such awards. See Belko v. AVX Corporation,
204 Cal App. 3d 894, 251 Cal Rptr. 557 (1988); Complete Interiors, Inc. v. Behan, 558
S.2d 48 (Fla. Ct. App. 1990).
The United States Supreme Court has not spoken definitively on this issue. However,
in Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987), the Court's rejec-
tion of the Second Circuit's refusal to allow a civil RICO claim to be submitted to arbi-
tration could be interpreted as an indication that the summary rejection of punitive dam-
age awards from arbitrators is disfavored by the Court's members. In McMahon, the de-
fendant, a brokerage firm, was charged by the plaintiff, a customer of the firm, with
churning the accounts of the plaintiff and misrepresentation in violation the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Id. at 223. The defendant demanded
that the claim be arbitrated pursuant to an arbitration clause contained in the customer
agreement signed by the plaintiff. Id. The plaintiff, on the other hand, claimed that the
RICO claim was nonarbitrable because the offense, racketeering, was criminal in nature
and thus had to be heard by the courts to satisfy the 'public interest in [its] enforce-
ment." Id. at 239. The Court rejected the defendant's argument, however, ruling that the
the civil nature of RICO claims made such claims subject to arbitratation. Id. at 242. As
a result, the vitality of the decision declaring awards of punitive damages per se invalid
is questionable if statutory treble damages are simply a subset of punitive damages. But
see Karen Ruga, Argument Against the Availability of Punitive Damages in Commercial
Arbitration, 62 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 270, 281-83 (1988) (arguing that punitive damages are
unaffected by Shearson/American Express since punitive and treble damages are governed
by different standards).
17. See, e.g, Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 793, 797, 386 N.Y.S.2d 831, 834
(1976) (stating that "[t]he freedom to contract does not embrace the freedom to punish,
even by contract" in rejecting an arbitrator's punitive damages award).
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As of 1992, the Court has not addressed the issue of whether
punitive damage awards from arbitrators violate the due process
requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment. However, in Pacific
Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip, the Court declared that a jury
award of punitive damages did not violate the same clause."8
Through Pacific Mutual, the Court defined the paradigm to be
used in scrutinizing the constitutionality of procedures for awarding
punitive damages. In May 1982, plaintiff-appellee, Cleopatra
Haslip, filed suit in a state trial court.' 9 Haslip alleged that Pacific
Mutual and one of its licensed agents, Lemmie L. Ruffin, Jr., had
commited fraud; Ruffin's misappropriation of Haslip's premium
payments caused her health coverage to lapse, unbeknownst to her,
leaving her unable to pay for a hospital stay.2"
The trial court instructed the jury that if it found the defen-
dant liable for fraud, it could award punitive damages in addition
to compensatory damages. 2' In defining the jury's task, the court
explained that the purpose of punitive damages was to punish the
defendant as well as to deter the defendant and others from engag-
ing similar conduct.22 The court also instructed that the decision
of whether to award punitive damages was "entirely discretionary
with the jury. 23
The jury found for the plaintiff and awarded a general verdict
of more than $1 million.24 The trial judge reviewed and upheld
the award.25
After the Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the decision,26
Pacific Mutual sought review by the United States Supreme Court,
alleging inter alia that punitive damages are barred by procedural
due process when the jury is given unlimited discretion to award
them. 2
7
The Court affirmed the Alabama decision. The majority began
18. 111 S. CL 1032 (1991).
19. Id. at 1036-37.
20. Id. at 1036.
21. Id. at 1037.
22. The trial judge instructed the jury: "Should you award punitive damages, in fixing
the amount, you must take into consideration the character and the degree of the wrong
as shown by the evidence and necessity of preventing similar wrong." Id.
23. Id. at 1037 n.1.
24. Id. at 1037, 1037 n.2. The Supreme Court assumed that more than $800,000 was
punitive damages.
25. Id. at 1044.
26. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 553 So. 2d 537 (Ala. 1989).
27. Pacific Mutual, 111 S. Ct. at 1037.
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by reasoning that the long common law tradition of allowing juries
significant discretion in awarding punitive damages precluded the
Court from declaring procedures for awarding such damages per se
unconstitutional.28 Rather, the Court's narrow objective was to
determine whether the particular procedures Alabama had chosen
met "general concerns of reasonableness" and were thus constitu-
tional.2
9
The foundation for the Court's conclusion that the jury in-
structions "reasonably accommodated Pacific Mutual's interest in
rational decision-making and Alabama's interest in meaningful
individualized assessment of appropriate deterrence and retribu-
tion"30 rested on a trio of assertions. First, the majority noted that
the "significant" jury discretion was circumscribed by the instruc-
tions which expressly tied the award to deterrence and retributive
objectives.3' Second, the Court added that the trial court's instruc-
tions directing the jury to "take into consideration the character and
the degree of wrong as shown by the evidence and necessity of
preventing similar wrong" further limited the jury's discretion.32
Finally, the Court pointed to Alabama's post-verdict review proce-
dures at both the trial and appellate levels as additional checks on
the reasonableness of a punitive damage award.33 The combination
of these three fact-specific factors enabled the Court to conclude
that the punitive damage awards in Pacific Mutual did not violate
procedural due process principles grounded on a reasonableness
objective.
In a concurring opinion, Justice Scalia focused on history and
tradition as the basis for reaching the same conclusion as the ma-
jority. Admonishing the majority for its reliance on the fact-based
reasonableness standard,34 Justice Scalia elected instead to apply a
more defined due process test, stating that "no procedure firmly
rooted in the practices of our people can be so 'fundamentally
unfair' as to deny due process of the law., 35 Justice Scalia went
further to argue that the history of due process demonstrated clear-
ly that "if the government chooses to follow a historically ap-
28. Id. at 1041-43.
29. Id. at 1043.
30. Id. at 1044.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 1044-46.
34. Id. at 1047 (Scalia, J. concurring).
35. Id. at 1053.
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proved procedure, it necessarily provides due process. "36 Thus,
Justice Scalia opted to dispense with the majority's "rootless" anal-
ysis which he viewed as dependent solely on the predilections of
the nine members of the Court. Instead, he favored an approach
which endeavors to find evidence of historical and traditional ac-
quiescence in defining a particular procedure to determine whether
it fulfills constitutional due process requirements.
Justice O'Connor's application of the Mathews v. Eldridge37
paradigm led her to the inescapable conclusion that the Alabama
procedures for awarding punitive damages were unconstitutional.
Mathews requires courts to consider three factors in determining
the process due in a particular context: (1) the private interest at
stake, (2) the risk that existing procedures will wrongly impair the
interest, and (3) the government's interest in maintaining the exist-
ing procedure.38
Justice O'Connor first determined that a strong private interest
existed in Pacific Mutual as the parties attempted to avoid poten-
tially magnanimous damage awards that were punitive in nature.39
In addition, there was a strong risk of error generated by the
standardless nature of the system enabling jurors to use their own
prejudices and biases in determining damage awards.' Further,
Justice O'Connor asserted that this infirmity could be easily cured
by requiring jurors to apply more defined standards similar to those
already employed by the trial and appellate courts in post-verdict
review." The government interest in standardless instructions, ac-
cording to Justice O'Connor, was weak or even non-existent.42 By
balancing these three factors, Justice O'Connor was able to con-
clude that the Pacific Mutual instructions were unconstitutional.
Thus, the Pacific Mutual decision defined the approach em-
ployed by the Court in determining the propriety of punitive dam-
age awards with respect to the Constitution's procedural due pro-
cess requirements as well as those analyses which will be rejected
by the Court.
36. Id. at 1050 (emphasis omitted).
37. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
38. Id. at 335.
39. Pacific Mutual, 111 S.Ct. at 1062 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
40. Id.
41. Id. at 1064.
42. Id. at 1064-65.
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Ell. TODD SHIPYARDS CORP. V. CUNARD LINE, LTD.43
Disputes such as those giving rise to Todd Shipyards are
common in the commercial setting. In September 1983, Todd Ship-
yards Corporation ("Todd") and Cunard Line, Limited ("Cunard")
entered into a contract under which Todd would repair and refit
Cunard's passenger cruise ship, the M.V. Sagafjord
("SagafJord"). 44 Although the contract provided that "[d]rawings
and [s]pecifications pertinent to this Contract are attached hereto as
Exhibits A and B respectively, and made a part hereof," the provi-
sion unfortunately went unfulfilled.45 Cunard neglected to hire an
outside engineering firm to inspect the ship and prepare detailed
drawings for the project, failed to provide various materials or
sufficient installation instructions and failed to adequately pre-cus-
tomize certain fixtures.46 As a result of this neglect, Todd was
unable to complete the repair and conversion of the Sagafiord in
the contractually prescribed time and, as a result of its efforts to
meet the deadline without benefit of the missing plans and draw-
ings, incurred significant overtime labor expenses.47 Cunard relied
on this failure to meet the contractual deadline in "refus[ing] to
pay even the fixed contract price.'"48
Todd filed a suit against Cunard and against the Sagafjord in
rem seeking damages for breach of contract, quantum meruit,
breach of good faith and fair dealing and fraud.49 Pursuing its
rights under a comprehensive arbitration clause included in the
contract, Todd filed a demand for arbitration.5"
The arbitration hearings began in March 1985 and concluded
more than two years later with the panel awarding Todd in excess
of $6 million in compensatory damages, $1 million in punitive
damages and $4 million in attorneys' fees and costs.5 '
In response to Cunard's motion in the District Court of New
Jersey to vacate the award, Todd petitioned the District Court for
43. 943 F.2d 1056 (9th Cir. 1991).
44. Id. at 1058.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 1058-59.
47. Id. at 1059.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. See id. at 1059-61.
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the Northern District of California to confirm the award. The latter
court heard the case and confirmed the award in its entirety. 2
The Ninth Circuit heard the case on appeal in the decision at issue.
On appeal, Cunard asserted inter alia that the punitive damage
award from the arbitration panel violated due process because the
award was "not subject to the procedural strictures of the
courtroom."53 Cunard based its assertion on an application of the
Todd Shipyards facts to the Mathews paradigm. Cunard claims that
it had a "substantial" personal interest in not being deprived of the
$1 million award? 4 Further, Cunard argued that a substantial like-
lihood of erroneous deprivation existed because the arbitration pan-
el was not bound by any rules of evidence, procedure or substan-
tive law in its decisionmaking. 55 Buttressing this claim of errone-
ous deprivation, according to Cunard, was the exiguity of the ap-
pellate standard of review.5' Finally, Cunard added that the gov-
ernmental interest in the instant case was "minor." s The combina-
tion of these three factors, a substantial personal interest, a high
probability of erroneous deprivation and low governmental interest,
prompted Cunard to assert that it had been deprived of its constitu-
tional right to procedural due process.
The court rejected Cunard's argument as well as its use of a
pure Mathews approach. In its place, the court employed a hybrid
of Mathews, adding an estoppel element to the three Mathews
factors. Apparently acknowledging that Cunard's interest was in-
deed substantial and the government's interest was small, the court
chose to focus on the issue of whether the arbitration proceeding
would result in an erroneous deprivation. The court directly ad-
dressed this inquiry by summarily concluding that "Cunard had
every opportunity to present evidence, [and] to argue the merits of
its position" in front of the arbitration panel.58 Further, the court
asserted that Cunard had ample occasion "to challenge the
arbitrator's award in court." 59 Thus, presumably, the likelihood of
erroneous deprivation was small and, as a result, the process would
be sufficient to fulfill the due process requirements under the
52. Id. at 1059.
53. Id. at 1063.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 1064.
59. Id.
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Mathews paradigm.
However, the court went further by adding an estoppel hue to
its discussion. Relying on the fact that Cunard had voluntarily
agreed to arbitrate the dispute through a contractual provision, the
court held that Cunard was, in effect, estopped from "assert[ing]
that an award made pursuant to that agreement .. denies due
process because it is not sufficiently reliable.' 60 "Having taken
advantage of [the systemic protections], into which it entered vol-
untarily, Cunard cannot now argue that its due process was de-
nied." 6
1
IV. ANALYSIS
Significantly, the Pacific Mutual majority discarded unequivo-
cally both Justice Scalia's historical ramification approach and
Justice O'Connor's reliance on the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing
paradigm. In failing to endorse the proposal advanced by Justice
Scalia, the majority implicitly recognized the dynamic nature of the
concept of due process.62 Like other constitutional principles,63
due process is shaped and defined by societal values which are
constantly evolving and which reflect the vitality of ever-changing
circumstances.' To shackle due process with a construction mired
in historical confirmation is to ignore fundamental precepts of con-
stitutional interpretation.
The majority's rejection of the Mathews scheme endorsed by
Justice O'Connor is more immediately pertinent, however, since
this is the approach used by the court in the case at issue, Todd
Shipyards. The Mathews balancing test has been criticized as ex-
cessively utilitarian.65 The test assumes that there is a "correct
60. Id. at 1063-64.
61. Id. at 1064.
62. The Court has rejected reliance on historical fiat in several cases. See, e.g., Con-
necticut v. Doehr, 111 S. Ct. 2105, 2112 (1991) (tracking the evanescent quality of due
process through a series of cases).
63. See, e.g., Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367, 373 (1910) (declaring that
as a consequence of the ephemeral nature of the Constitution, any analysis of the pro-
scription of punishments and its relation to the eighth amendment "is not fastened to the
obsolete, but may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by humanjustice").
64. See 111 S. Ct. at 1065-66 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing the increase in size
and frequency of punitive damage awards as well as the recent proliferation of product
liability and mass tort litigation as factors favoring reevaluation of the constitutionality of
punitive damage awards).
65. See, e.g., Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculus for Admin-
1094 [Vol. 42:1085
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answer" that may be ascertained eventually through application of
increasing quantities of process; the more process used in determin-
ing the answer, the less likelihood there is of an erroneous conclu-
sion.'
However, presuming the presence of a "correct answer" is not
legitimate in the context of punitive damage awards. The objective
of reflecting societal outrage embodied in the retributive nature of
punitive damages is incongruous with the correct answer presump-
tion so critical to the Mathews approach:
[D]etermining the size of the [punitive damage] award has
traditionally been left to the sound discretion of juries
because the decision, like the prior decision on culpability,
is inherently subjective .... [I]t [is not] obvious that any
feasible instruction, however detailed, would enable juries
to get much closer to the mark (just the right amount of
punishment and deterrence, not too much, not too little),
because nobody really knows where the mark is. Economic
models can postulate a situation of optimum deterrence, but
they are singularly deficient in dealing with the punishment
objective. Moreover, values assigned to the variables in the
model are always hypothesized and, in a real life situation,
the true values remain anybody's guess. Historically, the
right to make that guess has been left to the jury, subject
to the right (and obligation) of the court to make a second
guess if the jury's verdict appears excessive, contrary to the
evidence, or the result of bias and prejudice.67
Thus, no matter how much process is employed to determine the
punitive damages which depict moral outrage, it is impossible to
authenticate the accuracy of the subjective emotive response. Con-
sequently, the Mathews paradigm is useless.
Instead, the Todd Shipyards court should have employed the
Pacific Mutual majority's reasonableness approach, an analysis
more amenable to the dynamic and subjective nature of the concept
of due process. While the Court neglected to clarify expressly the
components of punitive damage awards that made them constitu-
istrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of
Value, 44 U. CHi. L. REV. 28, 46-57 (1976).
66. Counterbalancing the utility of employing unlimited process is the objective of
judicial or administrative efficiency.
67. Riggs, supra note 1, at 900-01.
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tionally reasonable in light of the twin goals of retribution and
deterrence discussed in Pacific Mutual, this comment will endeavor
to extrapolate bases for the court's conclusion and apply them to
arbitral decisions exemplified by Todd Shipyards.
The Pacific Mutual opinion is fraught with unclear leaps that
obfuscate the nexus between the limited discretion of the jury and.
the reasonableness of the jury instructions. The Court noted that
the "not unlimited" discretion of the jury resulted from the court's
instructions directing the jury to link any punitive damage award
with the two goals of punitive damage awards, retribution and
deterrence. 68 The Court then declared the instructions to be "rea-
sonable" without any explanation for the connection of reasonable-
ness to those goals. 69 Rather, the Court inexplicably supported this
"reasonableness" conclusion with a trio of cases, two of which
found procedures invoked by administrative officials to be reason-
able.
In the first case, Schall v. Martin, the Court held procedures in
ordering pretrial detention of accused juveniles reasonable and
within the confines of the due process clause.7 ° The Court's rea-
soning centered on the deference to be accorded the expertise of
administrative judges, an expertise stemming from repeated expo-
sure to the same issues. The Court concluded that as a result of
this expertise, administrative judges were best-suited to make deten-
tion decisions and should be able to act unencumbered by constric-
tive regulations.71
In another case cited by the Pacific Mutual Court, Greenholtz
v. Inmates of the Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex, the
Court again deferred to the expertise of the administrators involved,
the parole board, in holding that, subsequent to a denial of parole,
the board was not required to present evidence from an inmate's
file to comport with due process.72
Despite the peculiar facts of these cases, the Pacific Mutual
Court applied their reasoning to awards made by juries. The Court
was apparently analogizing the role of jurors in the common law
system, purportedly expert representatives of the community at
large capable of expressing the outrage experienced by society and
68. See Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 111 S. Ct. 1032, 1044 (1991).
69. Id.
70. 467 U.S. 253 (1984).
71. Id. at 278-79.
72. 442 U.S. 1, 13-16 (1979).
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determining the quantity of punishment necessary for deterrence, to
the role of administrators illustrated by the Schall and Greenholtz
cases.73 The Court appeared to suggest that decisionmakers who
possess this expertise are best able to determine the appropriate
penalty for satisfying both the retributive and deterrent goals of
punishment. As a result, the presence of this decisionmaker exper-
tise weighs heavily in favor of a conclusion that the
decisionmaker's discretion was "exercised within reasonable con-
straints."
The features of the arbitral method parallel closely those of the
administrative experience and therefore support the reasonableness
of arbitrators awarding punitive damages. As in the administrative
context, a significant advantage of arbitration as a dispute resolu-
tion technique is its reliance on the expertise of the
decisionmaker.74 Arbitrators are considered experts primarily be-
cause of their familiarity with the practices of the members of a
particular trade.75 This familiarity is most likely gained through
close association with and study of the members of the trade,
and/or through a history of membership within the trade.
Arbitrators, by virtue of their status as experts in a particula:
field, are sensitive to the quantum of punishment required to deter
the parties from engaging in malicious or fraudulent conduct.76 As
a result of their familiarity with the members of a trade, arbitrators
are acutely aware of the amount of coercion necessary to trigger
behavioral responses from parties to a dispute (or at least, the
category of individuals represented by the parties to the dispute).
Thus, arbitrators are uniquely capable of determining the relative
73. Contrary to the Pacific Mutual holding, it might be argued that although juries are
capable of discerning the appropriate penalty to express the outrage of the community
thereby fulfilling the retributive objective of the punishment, they lack familiarity with the
behavior peculiar to parties involved in the dispute that might properly influence the mag-
nitude of the penalty necessary to deter future malfeasance by the parties in the pertinent
dispute and those similarly situated.
74. See, e.g., Butterkrust Bakeries v. Bakery, Conf. & Tobacco Wkrs., 726 F.2d 698,
699-700 (11th Cir. 1984) ("[A]rbitrators are expected to apply both the 'common law of
the shop* and their own personal judgment when resolving labor disputes.").
75. See, e.g., American Almond Products Co. v. Consolidated Pecan Sales Co., Inc.,
144 F.2d 448, 450 (2d Cir. 1944) ('In trade disputes one of the chief advantages of
arbitration is that the arbitrators can be chosen who are familiar with the practices and
customs of the calling, and with just such matter as what are current prices, what is mer-
chantable quality, what are the terms of sale, and the like.").
76. See generally Richard J. Medalie, COMMERCIAL ARBrrRATION FOR THE 1990s 83
(1991) ("Federal courts have found punitive damages in commercial matters to be an
effective deterrent to malicious or fraudulent conduct.").
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deterrent values of several penalties.
Arbitrators are similar to administrators in the sense that they
too are experts capable of fulfilling the retribution function of
punishment by fashioning a penalty which expresses community
abhorrence for the acts of the defendant. Arbitrators, as experts in
the practices of a particular trade, can determine issues of liability
which depend on whether or not the behavior of the parties "trans-
gress[es] the limits of acceptable practice in the trade."" The re-
tributive hue of this determination suggests that courts would readi-
ly acknowledge the ability of arbitrators to make judgments con-
cerning the retributive capacity of a penalty.78
Not only did the Pacific Mutual Court imply that the reason-
ableness of the decisionmaker's discretion was a function of the
ability of the decisionmaker to discern the penalty which would
best fulfill the deterrent goal as well as the retributive objective of
punishment, the Court also intimated that the decisionmaker would
have to strike the correct balance between the two ends in fashion-
ing the appropriate penalty.79 By recognizing this balance, the
Court is probably eluding to a belief that decisionmakers guided
solely by retributive desires have a proclivity toward fashioning
penalties which, though commensurate with society's abhorrence of
the defendants' acts, may unreasonably exceed the amount neces-
sary to deter the individuals. The deterrence objective thus acts as
a tempering mechanism, ensuring that excessive penalties are not
imposed on defendants in violation of their due process rights.
Nobody has the omniscience to predict the penalty that will
optimize both deterrent and retributive objectives. However, in
contrast to juries who sit for a single case, decisionmakers such as
arbitrators are exposed repeatedly to the administration of such
77. Richard P. Hackett, Note, Punitive Damages in Arbitration: The Search for a
Workable Rule, 63 CORNELL L. REv. 272, 287 (1978).
78. The court in South East Atlantic Shipping Ltd. v. Gamac Grain Co., 656 F.2d 189
(2d Cir. 1966), implicitly acknowledged the arbitrator's ability to express this retributive
capacity:
[A]lthough the [arbitration] panel majority's opinion indicates that they were
morally outraged by Garnac's conduct . . . the award was not punitive. More-
over, we think it within the arbitrator's power to consider such questions of
business morality in determining whether to award Atlantic the full extent of its
loss regardless of whether some of that loss, in retrospect, might have been
avoided. Such an award, however liberal, does not amount to an "unlawful"
assessment of punitive damages.
Id. at 192 (emphasis added).
79. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
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awards. In addition, they have a broad base of knowledge inherent
in their status as experts in the field. Thus, arbitrators are cogni-
zant of the effect of punitive damage awards on parties and on so-
ciety.
Further, unlike the rigid judicial system, the nature of the arbi-
tration process ensures the decisionmakers have the flexibility 0
necessary to fashion penalties which reflect the needs and relative
faults of the parties and consequently to achieve the retribu-
tive/deterrent balance closest to optimal, For instance, unlike judges
and juries, arbitrators are not required to render a decision for a
plaintiff or a defendant, "us[ing] 'burden of proof' to satisfy their
conscience, appellate tribunals and rules of law."8' Rather, when
confronted with a situation in which there is no clear right or
wrong, they can construct a compromised penalty which manifests
the proper retributive/deterrent nexus for the quantum of divined
fault.82 Also, where an arbitrator rejects certain claims made by a
party, the arbitrator may fashion an award which, though less than
that requested, is commensurate with the retributive and deterrent
goals endemic to the diminished fault.8 3 Finally, if parties such as
those in Todd Shipyards were engaged in a continuing contractual
relationship, an arbitrator could best balance the retributive and
deterrent objective by fashioning a penalty which would coerce the
defendant into continuing to perform while also punishing him for
his past nonperformance.8 4
The majority in Pacific Mutual failed to state explicitly wheth-
er post-verdict review, though present, was necessary to its holding,
and if so, the type of review constitutionally mandated. 5 As a
result, assuming the necessity of a review, the Todd Shipyards
review must be evaluated on the basis of the principles implicitly
required of the initial decisionmaker by the Pacific Mutual Court.
80. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
81. Philip G. Phillips, A Lawyer's Approach to Commercial Arbitration, 44 YALE L.J.
47, 48 (1934).
82. Id.
83. See Martin Domke, Commercial Arbitration, reprinted in MATERIALS ON THE
TECHNIQUES AND PROCESS FOR THE RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES, 1/3/p.7, 1/3fp. 8-9 (Alan I.
Widiss, ed. 1971).
84. See Hackett, supra note 77, at 292-93.
85. After concluding that the procedures employed in adjudicating the case sufficiently
constrained the discretion of the jury, the Pacific Mutual Court addressed the post-verdict
review of the Alabama Supreme Court. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 111 S. Ct.
1032, 1044-46 (1991). The sequence of this analysis suggests that this material on the
adequacy of the post-verdict review is dicta. However, this conclusion is far from clear.
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The review conducted by the Todd Shipyards court was defi-
cient according to the principles extrapolated from Pacific Mutual.
The Todd Shipyards court applied a standard requiring the
arbitrator's decision to be upheld unless it was "'completely irra-
tional,' or it constitut[ed] a 'manifest disregard of law."' 86 The
pertinent law, as required by the arbitration agreement, was New
York substantive ,law.87 Under New York law, "punitive damages
for fraud are available 'upon a showing of willful and wanton
conduct."' 88
This standard is deficient for a pair of reasons. First, the stan-
dard fails to mandate a check that deterrence is effected by the
punitive damage award. By contrast, the retributive function of the
penalty is accounted for in the standard because the court must
determine whether the defendant committed willful and wanton
conduct. "Willful" and "wanton" indicate the subjective determina-
tion of society's abhorrence of the conduct. However, the Pacific
Mutual Court stated that a system for awarding punitive damages
must reasonably further both retributive and deterrent goals. Thus,
any post-verdict review of the sufficiency of process employed in
awarding punitive damages must consider the goal of deterrence as
well as the objective of retribution.
A second deficiency in the standard is the lack of any review
of the reasonableness of the amount of the award. The Pacific
Mutual Court nebulously required reviewing courts to examine the
amount of the punitive damages award, concluding in the case
before it that a punitive damage award four times greater than the
compensatory damages came "close to .. . [but did] not cross the
line into the area of constitutional impropriety." 9 Thus, although
the Todd Shipyards court failed to review the reasonableness of the
amount of the punitive award, the Court would not likely consider
the award excessive because the punitive damages were only one
sixth of the compensatory damages awarded by the arbitrator.
As a result of these two deficiencies in the reviewing proce-
dure, and assuming the necessity of a post-verdict review similar to
that employed in Pacific Mutual, the Todd Shipyards court should
have rejected the punitive damages award as violating the Four-
86. Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Cunard Line, Ltd., 943 F.2d 1056, 1060 (9th Cir. 1991)
(quoting French v. Merrill Lynch, 784 F.2d 902, 906 (9th Cir. 1986)).
87. Id. at 1063.
88. Id. (quoting Faller Group, Inc. v. Jaffe, 564 F. Supp. 1177, 1185 (S.D.N.Y. 1983)).
89. Pacific Mutual, 111 S. Ct. at 1046.
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teenth Amendment mandate of procedural due process.
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